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Abstract
Despite having advanced a reaction-diffusion model of ODE’s in
his 1952 paper on morphogenesis, reflecting his interest in math-
ematical biology, Alan Turing has never been considered to have
approached a definition of Cellular Automata. However, his treatment
of morphogenesis, and in particular a difficulty he identified relating
to the uneven distribution of certain forms as a result of symmetry
breaking, are key to connecting his theory of universal computation
with his theory of biological pattern formation. Making such a
connection would not overcome the particular difficulty that Turing
was concerned about, which has in any case been resolved in biology.
But instead the approach developed here captures Turing’s initial
concern and provides a low-level solution to a more general question
by way of the concept of algorithmic probability, thus bridging
two of his most important contributions to science: Turing pattern
formation and universal computation. I will provide experimental
results of one-dimensional patterns using this approach, with no loss
of generality to a n-dimensional pattern generalisation.
Keywords: morphogenesis; pattern formation; Turing universality;
algorithmic probability; Levin-Chaitin coding theorem; mathematics
of emergence.
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1 Introduction
Much is known today about how pattern formation is accomplished in bi-
ology, and moreover about how this relates to Turing’s work. For instance,
the conditions that must be satisfied for pattern formation to occur are very
clear. Different diffusion rates alone are not sufficient, and it is well under-
stood why patterns are reproducible even if initiated by random fluctuations.
Today we also know that self-assembly is a process that differs from this
type of pattern formation, and we understand why, as a rule, early steps
in development are usually not based on symmetry breaking, although the
biochemical machinery would still be able to produce patterns under such
conditions.
This paper discusses the role of algorithmic probability in building a
bridge between Turing’s key scientific contributions on pattern formation and
universal computation. After discussing various aspects of pattern formation
in biology, cellular automata, and Turing machines, an approach based on
algorithmic information theory is introduced, and experimental results re-
lating to the complexity of producing one-dimensional patterns by running
Turing machines with 2 symbols are presented. Thus the paper reconnects
Turing’s work on morphogenesis with his work on Turing universality by way
of algorithmic probability as the theory of pattern formation at the lowest
level.
1.1 Turing patterns
Turing provided a mechanistic mathematical model to explain features of
pattern formation using reaction-diffusion equations, while coming close to
achieving a first definition of cellular automata. In a recent paper Wolfram
[56] asks whether perhaps Turing had Turing machines in mind when devel-
oping his model of morphogenesis. Coincidentally, while Turing was working
on his paper on pattern formation [50] (received in 1951, published in 1952),
Niels Barricelli was performing some digital simulations in an attempt to
understand evolution with the aid of computer experiments [6, 7, 22], and
a year after the publication of Turing’s paper, the team led by Watson and
Crick made a groundbreaking discovery (1953), viz. the double-helical struc-
ture of DNA [51]. Had Turing known about DNA as a biological molecule
serving as memory in biological systems, carrying the instructions for life, he
may have grasped the remarkable similarity between DNA and his machine
tapes [49].
For a central element in living systems happens to be digital: DNA se-
quences refined by evolution encode the components and the processes that
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guide the development of living organisms. It is this information that permits
the propagation of life. It is therefore natural to turn to computer science,
with its concepts designed to characterise information (and especially digital
information, of particular relevance to the study of phenomena such as DNA),
but also to computational physics, in order to understand the processes of
life.
Central to Turing’s discussion of pattern formation is the concept of sym-
metry breaking, which, however, is bedevilled by a certain difficulty that
Turing himself underscored, viz. how to explain the uneven distribution of
biological threats versus the random disturbances triggering his machinery
of reaction-diffusion. This difficulty will be generalised through the use of
the so-called coding theorem [10, 17] relating the frequency (or multiplicity)
of a pattern to its (algorithmic) complexity, and what is known as Levin’s
Universal Distribution, at the core of which is the concept of computational
universality and therefore the Turing machine. Thus we will be connecting
two of Turing’s most important contributions to science. I will propose that
a notion of emergence can be captured by algorithmic information theory,
matching identified features of emergence such as irreducibility with the ro-
bustness of persistent structures in biology. This amounts to suggesting that
part of what happens, even in the living world, can be understood in terms
of Turing’s most important legacy: the concept of universal computation.
Formally, a Turing machine can be described as follows: M = (Q ∪
H,Σ, δ), where Q is the finite set of (non-halting) states and H an identified
(halting) state, Σ is the finite set of symbols (including the blank symbol 0),
and δ is the next move function defined as: δ : Q×Σ→ (Σ×Q∪H×{L,R}).
If δ(s, q) = (s′, q′, D), when the machine is in state q ∈ Q and the head reads
symbol s ∈ Σ, the machine M replaces it with s′ ∈ Σ, changes to state
q′ ∈ Σ ∪H, and moves in direction D ∈ {L,R} (L for left and R for right).
1.2 Uneven distribution of biological forms
In the pursuit of his interest in biological pattern formation, Turing identified
symmetry breaking as key to the process behind the generation of structure.
The early development of, for example, an amphibian such as a frog is initi-
ated by fertilisation of an egg and a sequence of cell divisions that result in
something called a blastula. At some point the blastula acquires an axis of
symmetry and one can speak of the organism’s poles. So in the early stages
of development, the blastula cells cease to be identical and acquire differ-
ing characteristics, ultimately constituting different parts in the developed
organism. This process of differentiation of a group of cells became the fo-
cus of Turing’s interest. However, biological forms, as Turing notes, are not
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uniformly distributed, a difficulty that he believed required an explanation
[50]:
There appears superficially to be a difficulty confronting this the-
ory of morphogenesis, or, indeed, almost any other theory of it.
An embryo in its spherical blastula stage has spherical symmetry,
or if there are any deviations from perfect symmetry, they cannot
be regarded as of any particular importance, for the deviations
vary greatly from embryo to embryo within a species, though the
organisms developed from them are barely distinguishable. One
may take it therefore that there is perfect spherical symmetry.
But a system which has spherical symmetry, and whose state is
changing because of chemical reactions and diffusion, will remain
spherically symmetrical forever (The same would hold true if the
state were changing according to the laws of electricity and mag-
netism, or of quantum mechanics.). It certainly cannot result in
an organism such as a horse, which is not spherically symmetrical.
There is a fallacy in this argument. It was assumed that the devi-
ations from spherical symmetry in the blastula could be ignored
because it makes no particular difference what form of asymmetry
there is. It is, however, important that there are some [sic] de-
viations, for the system may reach a state of instability in which
these regularities, or certain components of them, tend to grow.
If this happens a new and stable equilibrium is usually reached,
with the symmetry entirely gone.
The phenomenon of symmetry breaking is central in Turing’s discussion,
as it is apparently the only possible explanation of the cause of the instability
needed to start off his mechanism of pattern formation from random distur-
bances. But it also presents a certain difficulty that Turing himself identified
as the problem of the uneven distribution of biological properties from ran-
dom disruptions (in his particular example, bilateral symmetry). Turing
reasoned that in the earliest stages of cell division, essentially identical sub-
units were being created. But eventually this homogeneous state gave way
to patterns, resulting from differentiation. In the next section (Left-handed
and right-handed organisms) of Turing’s paper [50], he identifies the paradox
of using random disturbances as the ignition for pattern formation, taking
as an example the morphological asymmetries of organisms and species:
The fact that there exist organisms which do not have left-right
symmetry does not in itself cause any difficulty. It has already
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been explained how various kinds of symmetry can be lost in the
development of the embryo, due to the particular disturbances
(or ‘noise’) influencing the particular specimen not having that
kind of symmetry, taken in conjunction with appropriate kinds of
instability. The difficulty lies in the fact that there are species in
which the proportions of left-handed and right-handed types are
very unequal.
Turing himself provides some clues as to why such a bias towards certain
asymmetries would arise. It is reasonable to expect that all manner of con-
straints shape the way in which symmetries occur, from physical to chemical
and of course biological forces (natural selection clearly being one of them).
But one needs to take into account that some of these disturbances may
be attenuated or amplified by physical, chemical or biological constraints,
producing asymmetries. Gravity, for example, is a non-symmetric force (it
always pulls from the outside toward the centre of the earth) that imposes a
clear constraint (animal locomotion is therefore always found to be towards
the surface of the earth). Today we know that parity violation is common,
and not only in the biological world—the surrounding physical world has a
bias towards matter (as opposed to anti-matter), and it is well known that
explaining how an homochirality imbalance towards left-handed molecules
arises is difficult (see [39]). But just as physical, chemical and biological forces
impose constraints on the shapes organisms may assume, the informational
character of the way in which organisms unfold from digital instructions en-
coded in DNA means that they must also be subject to informational and
computational principles, one of which determines the frequency distribution
of patterns in connection to their algorithmic complexity.
The amphibian embryo mentioned above represents a signal instance
where symmetry breaking is circumvented: one axis is already irreversibly
determined before fertilisation takes place, and a second axis is fixed by the
entry of the sperm, which initiates an intricate chain of downstream events.
We stress that the aim of this paper is not to confront these problems in
biology. A biologist interested in Turing’s mechanism may think it would
hardly profit from more formal connections or a better understanding of
how a Turing machine works. However, I think that algorithmic probability,
which is based on Turing’s notion of universality, does have great relevance
to biology, being potentially capable of explaining aspects of designability
and robustness [30].
That Turing himself wasn’t able to make a direct connection between his
ideas on biology and computation at a deeper level is understandable. Here
I will make a connection by way of the theory of algorithmic information,
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Figure 1: Turing patterns exhibited in simple 2D binary-state totalistic and semi-
totalistic CA. In this case patterns generated by so-called Generations CA with
inhibition-activation Turing type oscillatory properties. Plotted here are the so-
called Bloomerang (left) and R(1616) (right), found by John Elliott, the latter
studied in [1].
a theory that was developed a decade after Turing’s paper on morphogen-
esis. The proposed generalisation reconnects Turing’s machines to Turing’s
patterns.
2 Turing’s computational universality
The basic finding is that there is a cyclical dynamic process that some chem-
icals are capable of, so that they inhibit and reactivate each other in a quasi-
periodic fashion. The essential value of Turing’s contribution lies in his dis-
covery that simple chemical reactions could lead to stable pattern formation
by first breaking the symmetry of the stable chemical layer with another
chemical. Morphogens, as substances capable of interacting and producing
patterns, had been studied since the end of the 19th. century [34], but what
matters in Turing’s model isn’t the particular identity of the chemicals, but
how they interact in a mechanical fashion modelled by a pair of equations,
with concentrations oscillating between high and low and spreading across
an area or volume.
The specific equations that Turing advanced do not apply to every pattern
formation mechanism, and researchers have derived other formation processes
either by extending Turing’s framework or in various other ways (see [38]).
I wish, however, to bridge Turing’s work and his other seminal contri-
bution to science: universality. This by way of a low-level explanation of
pattern formation, a purely computational approach to pattern formation
that was not available in Turing’s day. The theory encompasses all kinds of
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patterns, even outside of biology.
Turing’s most important contribution to science was his definition of uni-
versal computation, an attempt to mechanise the concept of a calculating
machine (or a computer). A universal (Turing) machine is an abstract de-
vice capable of carrying out any computation for which an instruction can
be written. More formally, we say that a Turing machine U is universal if
for an input s for a Turing machine M , U applied to (< M >, s) halts if M
halts on s and provides the same result as M , and does not halt if M does
not halt for s. In other words, U simulates M for input s, with M and s an
arbitrary Turing machine and an arbitrary input for M .
The concept formed the basis of the digital computer and, as suggested
in [9], there is no better place in nature where a process similar to the way
Turing machines work can be found than in the unfolding of DNA transcrip-
tion. For DNA is a set of instructions contained in every living organism
empowering the organism to self-replicate. In fact it is today common, even
in textbooks, to consider DNA as the digital repository of the organism’s
development plan, and the organism’s development itself is not infrequently
thought of as a mechanical, computational process in biology.
2.1 Turing’s anticipation of a definition of Cellular Au-
tomata
The basic question Turing raised in his morphogenesis paper [50] concerned
the way in which cells communicated with each other in order to form struc-
tures. In proposing his model he laid down a schema that may seem similar
to cellular automata in several respects.
The theory of cellular automata is a theory of machines consisting of
cells that update synchronously at discrete time steps. The earliest known
examples were two-dimensional and were engineered with specific ends in
view (mainly having to do with natural phenomena, both physical and bio-
logical) and are attributed to Ulam [52] and von Neumann [42]. The latter
considered a number of alternative approaches between 1948 and 1953 before
deciding on a formulation involving cellular automata. 2D cellular automata
are even more relevant to natural systems because biology is essentially a
two-dimensional science. One almost always thinks about and studies bi-
ological objects such as cells and organs as two-dimensional objects. Life
is cellular (in the biological sense), and cells build organs by accumulating
in two-dimensional layers (we are basically a tube surrounding other tubu-
lar organs, and the development of all these organs is also basically two-
dimensional). Among cellular automata there is one particular kind studied
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by Wolfram [55] called Elementary Cellular Automata (ECA), because by
most, if not any standards, they constitute the simplest rulespace set. An
ECA is a one-dimensional CA the cells of which can be in two states, and
which update their states according to their own state and the states of their
two closest neighbours on either side.
Formally, an elementary cellular automaton (ECA) is defined by a local
function f : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1}, which maps the state of a cell and its two
immediate neighbours to a new cell state. There are 22
3
= 256 ECAs and each
of them is identified by its Wolfram number ω =
∑
a,b,c∈0,1 2
4a+2b+cf(a, b, c)
[55].
It is in fact clear that the once commonly held belief about automata, viz.
that complex behaviour required complex systems (with a large number of
components) derived from von Neuman’s [42]. But this was soon falsified by
the work of, for example, Minsky [41], and generally disproved by Wolfram
[55] with his systematic minimalistic approach.
Turing’s problem, however, was completely different, as it was not about
self-replication but about producing patterns from simple components, ex-
cept that Turing would describe the transition among cells by way of ordinary
differential equations. But one of Turing’s two approaches was very close to
the current model of CA, at least with respect to some of its most basic
properties (and not far from modern variations of continuous Cellular Au-
tomata).
However, it was von Neumann who bridged the concepts of Turing uni-
versality and self-replication using his concept of the universal constructor,
giving rise to the model of CA, and demonstrated that the process was inde-
pendent of the constructor. This was not trivial, because the common belief
was that the constructor had to be more complicated than the constructed.
von Neumann showed that a computer program could contain both the con-
structor and the description of itself to reproduce another system of exactly
the same type, in the same way that Turing found that there were Turing
machines that were capable of reproducing the behaviour of any other Turing
machine.
Among the main properties of cellular automata (CA) as a model of com-
putation (as opposed to, for example, Turing machines) is that their memory
relies on the way states depend on each other, and on the synchronous up-
dating of all cells in a line in a single unit of time.
For a one-dimensional CA (or ECA) the evolution of the cells change their
states synchronously according to a function f . After time t the value of a
cell depends on its own initial state together with the initial states of the N
immediate left and n immediate right neighbour cells. In fact, for t = 1 we
define f 1(r−1, r0, r1) = f(r−1, r0, r1).
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An immediate problem with defining the state of a cell on the basis of
its own state and its neighbours’ states is that there may be cells on the
boundaries of a line which have no neighbours to the right or the left. This
could be solved either by defining special rules for these special cases, or as
is the common practice, by configuring these cells in a circular arrangement
(toroidal for a 2D ECA), so that the leftmost cell has as its neighbour the
rightmost cell. This was the choice made by Turing. To simplify his math-
ematical model, he only considered the state’s chemical component, such as
the chemical composition of each separate cell and the diffusibility of each
substance between two adjacent cells. Since he found it convenient to arrange
them in a circle, cell i = N and i = 0 are the same, as are i = N + 1 and
i = 1. In Turing’s own words [50]:
One can say that for each r satisfying 1 ≤ r ≤ N cell r exchanges
material by diffusion with cells r − 1 and r + 1. The cell-to-cell
diffusion constant from X will be called µ, and that for Y will
be called ν. This means that for a unit concentration difference
of X, this morphogen passes at the rate µ from the cell with the
higher concentration to the (neighbouring) cell with the lower
concentration.
Turing’s model was a circular configuration of similar cells (forming, for
example, a tissue), with no distinction made among the cells, all of which were
in the same initial state, while their new states were defined by concentrations
of biochemicals. The only point of difference from the traditional definition of
a cellular automaton, as one can see, is in the transition to new states based
on the diffusion function f = µ, ν which dictates how the cells interact,
satisfying a pair of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Just as in a
traditional cellular automaton, in Turing’s model the manner in which cells
would interact to update their chemical state involved the cell itself and
the closest cell to the right and to the left, resulting in the transmission of
information in time.
Turing studied the system for various concentrations satisfying his ODEs.
He solved the equations for small perturbations of the uniform equilibrium
solution (and found that his approach, when applied to cells and points, led
to indistinguishable results). Turing showed that there were solutions to his
ODEs governing the updating of the cells for which stable states would go
from an initial homogeneous configuration at rest to a diffusive instability
forming some characteristic patterns. The mathematical description is given
by several ODEs but Turing was clearly discretising the system in units,
perhaps simply because he was dealing with biological cells. But the fact
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that the units were updated depending on the state of the cell and the state
of neighbouring cells brings this aspect of Turing’s work close to the modern
description of a cellular automaton.
That the mechanism could produce the same patterns whether the units
were cells or points suggests that the substratum is less important than the
transition mechanism and, as Turing pointed out, this wouldn’t be surprising
if the latter situation is thought of as a limiting case of the former. The
introduction of cells, however, may have also been a consequence of his ideas
on computation, or else due to the influence of, for example, von Neumann.
2.2 Inhibition and activation oscillatory phenomena
Turing was the first to realise that the interaction of two substances with
different diffusion rates could cause pattern formation. An excellent survey
of biological pattern formation is available in [31]. At the centre of Tur-
ing’s model of pattern formation is the so-called reaction-diffusion system.
It consists of an “activator,” a chemical that can produce more of itself; an
“inhibitor” that slows production of the activator; and a mechanism diffus-
ing the chemicals. A question of relevance here is whether or not this kind
of pattern formation is essentially different from non-chemically based dif-
fusion. It turns out that Turing pattern formation can be simulated with
simple rule systems such as cellular automata. In 1984, Young [57] proposed
to use Cellular Automata to simulate the kind of reaction-diffusion systems
delineated by Turing. He considered cells laid out on a grid in two states
(representing pigmented and not pigmented). The pigmented cell was as-
sumed to produce a specified amount of activator and a specified amount of
inhibitor that diffused at different rates across the lattice. The status of each
cell changed over time depending on the rules, which took into account the
cell’s own behaviour and that of its neighbours. Young’s results were simi-
lar to those obtained using continuous reaction-diffusion equations, showing
that this behaviour is not peculiar to the use of ODEs.
Seashells, for example, provide a unique opportunity because they grow
one line at a time, just like a one-dimensional (1D) cellular automaton, just
like a row of cells in Turing’s model. The pigment cells of a seashell reside
in a band along the shell’s lip, and grow and form patterns by activating
and inhibiting the activity of neighbouring pigment cells. This is not an
isolated example. Seashells seem to mimic all manner of cellular automata
patterns [40, 55], and moving wave patterns can be simulated by 2D cellular
automata, producing a wide range of possible animal skin patterns.
In [1], reaction/diffusion-like patterns in CA were investigated in terms of
space-time dynamics, resulting in the establishment of a morphology-based
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Figure 2: Mathematical simulation of a Belouzov-Zhabotinsky reaction (left)
[8]. The Belousov-Zhabotinsky chemical reaction pattern can be implemented
by means of a 2D totalistic CA (right) with a range 1, 20-colour totalistic CA
[58]. In the same rule space of 2D CA a wide number of rules produce Belousov-
Zhabotinsky patterns.
classification of rules. The simplest possible model of a quasi-chemical system
was considered, based on a 2D CA and Moore neighbourhood with two states
or colours. As defined in [1], every cell updates its state by a piecewise rule.
In this type of cellular automaton a cell in state 0 assumes state 1 if the
number of its neighbours in state 1 falls within a certain interval. Once in
state 1 a cell remains in this state forever. In this way the model provides
a substrate and a reagent. When the reagent diffuses into the substrate it
becomes bound to it, and a kind of cascade precipitation occurs. As shown
in [40], a cascade of simple molecular interactions permits reliable pattern
formation in an iterative way.
Beyond their utilitarian use as fast-prototyping tools, simple systems such
as CA that are capable of abstracting the substratum from the mechanism
have the advantage of affording insights into the behaviour of systems inde-
pendent of physical or chemical carriers. One may, for example, inquire into
the importance of the right rates of systems if these reactions are to occur.
As with seashells, statistical evidence and similarities between systems don’t
necessarily prove that the natural cases are cases of Turing pattern forma-
tion. They could actually be produced by some other chemical reaction, and
just happen to look like Turing patterns. That pigmentation in animals is
produced by Turing pattern formation is now generally accepted, but it is
much more difficult to ascribe the origin of what we take to be patterns in
certain other places to Turing-type formations.
But as I will argue in the following section, a theoretical model based on
algorithmic probability suggests that the simpler the process generating a
11
pattern, the greater the chances of its being the kind of mechanistic process
actually underlying Turing pattern formation. For there is a mathematical
theory which asserts that among the possible processes leading to a given
pattern, the simplest is the one most likely to be actually producing it. Pro-
cesses similar to Turing pattern formation would thus be responsible for most
of the patterns in the world around us, not just the special cases. Turing
patterns would fit within this larger theory of pattern formation, which by
the way is the acknowledged mathematical theory of patterns, even if it is
not identified as such in the discourse of the discipline. On account of its
properties it is sometimes called the miraculous distribution [33].
3 Turing patterns with Turing machines
As recently observed by [9], the most interesting connection to Turing’s mor-
phogenesis is perhaps to be found in Turing’s most important paper on com-
putation [49], where the concept of computational universality is presented.
We strengthen that connection in this paper by way of the concept of algo-
rithmic probability.
As has been pointed out by Cooper [15], Turing’s model of computation
[49] was the one that was closest to the mechanistic spirit of the Newtonian
paradigm in science. The Turing machine offered a model of computability
of functions over the range of natural numbers and provided a framework
of algorithmic processes with an easy correspondence to physical structures.
In other words, Turing’s model brought with it a mechanical realisation of
computation, unlike other approaches.
Turing made another great contribution in showing that universality came
at a cost, it being impossible to tell whether or not a given computation would
halt without actually performing the computation (assuming the availability
of as much time as would be needed). Turing established that for compu-
tational systems in general, one cannot say whether or not they would halt,
thereby identifying a form of unpredictability of a fundamental nature even
in fully deterministic systems.
As Cooper points out [15], it is well-known in mathematics that com-
plicated descriptions may take us beyond what is computable. In writing
a program to tackle a problem, for example, one has first to find a precise
way to describe the problem, and then devise an algorithm to carry out the
computation that will yield a solution. To arrive at the solution then, one
has to run a machine on the program that has been written. My colleagues
and I have made attempts in the past to address epistemological questions
using information theory and computer experiments, with some interesting
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results [25].
Computer simulations performed as part of research into artificial life have
reproduced various known features of life processes and of biological evolu-
tion. Evolution seems to manifest some fundamental properties of computa-
tion, and not only does it seem to resemble an algorithmic process [19, 55],
it often seems to produce the kinds of persistent structures and output dis-
tributions a computation could be expected to produce [59].
Among recent discoveries in molecular biology is the finding that genes
form building blocks out of which living systems are constructed [47], a dis-
covery that sheds new light on the common principles underlying the develop-
ment of organs that are functional components rather than mere biochemical
ingredients. The theory of evolution serves as one grand organising principle,
but as has been pointed out before [43, 11, 12, 13], it has long lacked a formal
mathematical general theory, despite several efforts to supply this deficiency
(e.g. [27, 23, 24]).
Recently there has been an interest in the “shape” of a self-assembled
system as output of a computational process [2, 45, 3, 46, 4]. These kinds of
processes have been modelled using computation before [53], and the concept
of self-assembly has been extensively studied by computer scientists since von
Neumann [42], who himself studied features of computational systems capa-
ble of displaying persistent self-replicating structures as an essential aspect of
life, notably using CA. Eventually these studies produced systems manifest-
ing many features of life processes [29, 35, 55], all of which have turned out
to be profoundly connected to the concept of (Turing) universal computation
(Conway’s Game of Life, Langton’s ant, Wolfram’s Rule 110). Some artificial
self-assembly models [45], for example, demonstrate all the features neces-
sary for Turing-universal computation and are capable of yielding arbitrary
shapes [54] such as a Turing-universal biomolecular system.
It is known that computing systems capable of Turing universality have
properties that are not predictable in principle. In practice too it has been
the case that years of various attempts have not yet yielded a formula for
predicting the evolution of certain computing systems, despite their appar-
ent simplicity. An example is the elementary CA Rule 30 [55], by most
measures the simplest possible computing rule exhibiting apparently random
behaviour.
So the question is how deeply pattern formation and Turing universality
are connected. If reformulated, the answer to this question is not far to
find. The Turing universality of a system simply refers to its capability of
producing any possible pattern, and the question here as well is simply by
what specific means (what programs), and how often these programs can be
found to produce patterns in nature. The answer, again, can be derived from
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algorithmic information theory, particularly algorithmic probability, at the
core of which is the concept of Turing universality.
Today we know that the necessary elements for (Turing) computational
universality are minimal, as shown by Rule 110 and tag systems that have
led to the construction of the smallest Turing machines capable of universal
computation [55, 14, 44].
One way to connect Turing’s theory of morphogenesis to his theory of
computation is by way of the theory of algorithmic information, a theory
that was developed at least a decade later [32, 11], and wouldn’t really be
known (being rediscovered several times) until two decades later. Turing
couldn’t have anticipated such a connection, especially with regard to a pos-
sible generalisation of the problem he identified concerning the violation of
parity after random symmetry breaking by (uniform) random disruptions,
which would then lead to a uniform distribution of patterns—something that
to us seems clearly not to be the case. As we will see, by introducing the
concept of algorithmic probability we use a law of information theory that
can account for important bias but not for symmetry violation. Hence while
the theory may provide a solution to a generalised problem, it is likely that
symmetry imbalance is due to a non-informational constraint, hence a phys-
ical, chemical or biological constraint that organisms have to reckon with in
their biological development. The proposed generalisation reconnects Turing
patterns to Turing machines.
The algorithmic complexity KU(s) of a string s with respect to a univer-
sal Turing machine U , measured in bits, is defined as the length in bits of
the shortest (prefix-free1) Turing machine U that produces the string s and
halts [32, 11, 36, 48]. Formally,
KU(s) = min{|p|, U(p) = s} where |p| is the length of p measured in bits.
(1)
This complexity measure clearly seems to depend on U , and one may
ask whether there exists a Turing machine which yields different values of
KU(s) for different U . The ability of Turing machines to efficiently simulate
each other implies a corresponding degree of robustness. The invariance
theorem [48, 11] states that if KU(s) and KU ′(s) are the shortest programs
generating s using the universal Turing machines U and U ′ respectively,
their difference will be bounded by an additive constant independent of s.
Formally:
1That is, a machine for which a valid program is never the beginning of any other
program, so that one can define a convergent probability the sum of which is at most 1.
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|KU(s)−KU ′(s)| ≤ cU,U′ (2)
Hence it makes sense to talk about K(s) without the subindex U . K(s)
is lower semi-computable, meaning that it can be approximated from above,
for example, via lossless compression algorithms.
From equation 1 and based on the robustness provided by equation 2, one
can formally call a string s a Kolmogorov (or algorithmically) random string
if K(s) ∼ |s| where |s| is the length of the binary string s. Hence an object
with high Kolmogorov complexity is an object with low algorithmic struc-
ture, because Kolmogorov complexity measures randomness—the higher the
Kolmogorov complexity, the more random. This is the sense in which we
use the term algorithmic structure throughout this paper—as opposed to
randomness.
3.1 Algorithmic probability
As for accounting for unequal numbers of patterns, the notion of algorithmic
probability, introduced by Ray Solomonoff [48] and formalised by Leonid
Levin [36], describes the probability distribution of patterns when produced
by a (computational) process. The algorithmic probability of a string s is the
probability of producing s with a random program p running on a universal
(prefix-free) Turing machine. In terms of developmental biology, a prefix-
free machine is a machine that cannot start building an organism, and having
done so, begin building another one, because a valid (self-delimited) program
describing the instructions for building a viable organism cannot contain
another valid (self-delimited) program for building another one. Formally,
Pr(s) =
∑
p:U(p)=s
2−|p| (3)
That is, the sum over all the programs for which the universal Turing
machine U with p outputs the string s and halts. U is required to be a
universal Turing machine to guarantee that the definition is well constructed
for any s, that is, that there is at least a program p running on U that
produces s. As p is itself a binary string, Pr(s) is the probability that the
output of U is s when provided with a random program (with each of its
program bits independent and uniformly distributed).
Pr(s) is related to algorithmic (Kolmogorov) complexity [48, 32, 36, 11] in
that the length of the shortest program (hence K(s)) is the maximum term
in the summation of programs contributing to Pr(s). But central to the
concept of algorithmic emergence is the following (coding) theorem [17, 10]:
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K(s) = −logPr(s) +O(1) or simply K(s) ∼ −logPr(s) (4)
An interpretation of this theorem is that if a string has many long descriptions
it also has a short one [21].
In essence this coding theorem asserts that the probability of a computer
producing the string s when fed with a random program running on a uni-
versal Turing machine U is largely determined by K(s). This means that
outputs having low algorithmic complexity (‘structured’ outputs) are highly
probable, while random looking outputs (having high algorithmic complex-
ity) are exponentially less likely. The fact that Pr(s) ≈ 2−K(s) is non-obvious
because there are an infinite number of programs generating s, so a priori
s may have had high universal probability due to having been generated by
numerous long programs. But the coding theorem [10, 17] shows that if an
object has many long descriptions, it must also have a short one.
To illustrate the concept, let’s say that a computation keeps producing an
output of alternating 1s and 0s. Algorithmic probability would indicate that,
if no other information about the system were available, the best possible bet
is that after n repetitions of 01 or 10 the computation will continue in the
same fashion. Therefore it will produce another 01 or 10 segment. In other
words, patterns are favoured, and this is how the concept is related to algo-
rithmic complexity—because a computation with low algorithmic random-
ness will present more patterns. And according to algorithmic probability, a
machine will more likely produce and keep (re)producing the same pattern.
Algorithmic probability as a theory of patterns has the advantage of as-
suming very little, and stands out as a particularly simple way to illustrate
the general principle of pattern formation.
3.2 Homogeneity and the breakdown of symmetry
The transition rules described in Turing’s paper with the ODEs would allow
the cells to “communicate” via diffusion of the chemicals, and the question
in the context of symmetry was whether the aggregation of cells commu-
nicating via diffusion would remain in an homogeneous resting state. The
model indicates that depending upon the chemical reactions and the nature
of the diffusion, the aggregation of cells (e.g. a tissue) would be unstable and
would develop patterns as a result of a break in the symmetry of chemical
concentrations from cell to cell.
The development of multicellular organisms begins with a single fertilised
egg, but the unfolding process involves the specification of diverse cells of
different types. Such an unfolding is apparently driven by an asymmetric
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cell division crucial in determining the role of each cell in the organism’s
body plan. Pattern formation occurs outside of equilibrium at the centre of
this kind of symmetry breaking.
In the real world, highly organised strings have little chance of making it
if they interact with other systems, because symmetry is very weak. Yet not
only do structures persist in the world (otherwise we would only experience
randomness), but they may in fact be generated by symmetry breaking.
Changing a single bit, for example, destroys a perfect 2-period pattern of
a (01)n string, and the longer the string, the greater the odds of it being
destroyed by an interaction with another system. But a random string will
likely remain random-looking after changing a single bit.
One can then rather straightforwardly derive a thermodynamical prin-
ciple based on the chances of a structure being created or destroyed. By
measuring the Hamming distance between strings of the same length, we
determine the number of changes that a string needs to undergo in order
to remain within the same complexity class (the class of strings with iden-
tical Komogorov complexity), and thereby determine the chances of its con-
serving structure versus giving way to randomness. If H is the function
retrieving the Hamming distance, and s =010101 is the string subject to
bit changes, it can only remain symmetrical under the identity or after a
H(010101, 101010) = 6 bit-by-bit transformation to remain in the same low
Kolmogorov (non-random) complexity class (the strings are in the same com-
plexity class simply because one is the reversion of the other). On the other
hand, a more random-looking string of the same length, such as 000100,
only requires H(000100, 001000) = 2 changes to remain in the same high
(random-looking) Kolmogorov complexity class. In other words, the short-
est path for transforming s =010101 into s′ =101010 requires six changes
to preserve its complexity, while the string 000100 requires two changes to
become 001000 in the same complexity class. It is clear that the classical
probability of six precise bit changes occurring is lower than the probability
of two such changes occurring. Moreover, the only chance the first string
010101 has of remaining in the same complexity class is by becoming the
specific string 101010, while for the second string 000100, there are other
possibilities: 001000, 110111 and 111011. In fact it seems easier to provide
an informational basis for thermodynamics than to explain how structures
persist in such an apparently weak state of the world.
But things are very different where the algorithmic approach of low-level
generation of structure is concerned. If it is not a matter of a bit-by-bit
transformation of strings but rather of a computer program that generates
s′ out of s (its conditional Kolmogorov complexity), that is K(s′, s) then the
probabilities are very different, and producing structured strings turns out to
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actually be more likely than producing random-looking ones. So, for example,
if instead of changing a string bit by bit one uses a program to reverse it, the
reversing program is of fixed (short) length and will remain the same size in
comparison to the length of the string being reversed. This illustrates the
way in which algorithmic probability differs from classical probability when
it comes to symmetry preserving and symmetry breaking.
Algorithmic probability does not solve Turing’s original problem, because
a string and its reversed or (if in binary) complementary version have the
same algorithmic probability (for a numerical calculation showing this phe-
nomenon and empirically validating Levin’s coding theorem, see [18]). The
weakness of symmetrical strings in the real world suggests that symmetric
bias is likely to be of physical, chemical or even biological origin, just as
Turing believed.
3.3 A general algorithmic model of structure forma-
tion
When we see patterns/order in an object (e.g. biological structures), we tend
to think they cannot be the result of randomness. While this is certainly true
if the parts of the object are independently randomly generated, the coding
theorem shows that it is not true if the object is the result of a process (i.e.
computation) which is fed randomness. Rather if the object is the result of
such a process, we should fully expect to see order and patterns.
Based on algorithmic probability, Levin’s universal distribution [36] (also
called Levin’s semi-measure) describes the expected pattern frequency dis-
tribution of an abstract machine running a random program relevant to my
proposed research program. A process that produces a string s with a pro-
gram p when executed on a universal Turing machine U has probability
Pr(s).
For example, if you wished to produce the digits of the mathematical
constant pi by throwing digits at random, you’d have to try again and again
until you got a few consecutive numbers matching an initial segment of the
expansion of pi. The probability of succeeding would be very small: 1/10 to
the power of the desired number of digits in base 10. For example, (1/10)5000
for a segment of only length 5000 digits of pi. But if instead of throwing digits
into the air one were to throw bits of computer programs and execute them on
a digital computer, things turn out to be very different. A program producing
the digits of the expansion of pi would have a greater chance of being produced
by a computer program shorter than the length of the segment of the pi
expected. The question is whether there are programs shorter than such a
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segment. For pi we know they exist, because it is a (Turing) computable
number.
Consider an unknown operation generating a binary string of length k
bits. If the method is uniformly random, the probability of finding a particu-
lar string s is exactly 2−k, the same as for any other string of length k, which
is equivalent to the chances of picking the right digits of pi. However, data
(just like pi—largely present in nature, for example, in the form of common
processes relating to curves) are usually produced not at random but by a
specific process.
But there is no program capable of finding the shortest programs (due
to the non-computability of Pr(s) [36, 11]), and this limits the applicability
of such a theory. Under this view, computer programs can in some sense be
regarded as physical laws: they produce structure by filtering out a portion
of what one feeds them. And such a view is capable of explaining a much
larger range, indeed a whole world of pattern production processes. Start
with a random-looking string and run a randomly chosen program on it,
and there’s a good chance your random-looking string will be turned into
a regular, often non-trivial, and highly organised one. In contrast, if you
were to throw particles, the chances that they’d group in the way they do if
there were no physical laws organising them would be so small that nothing
would happen in the universe. It would look random, for physical laws, like
computer programs, make things happen in an orderly fashion.
Roughly speaking, Pr(s) establishes that if there are many long descrip-
tions of a certain string, then there is also a short description (low algorithmic
complexity), and vice versa. As neither C(s) nor Pr(s) is computable, no
program can exist which takes a string s as input and produces Pr(s) as
output. Although this model is very simple, the outcome can be linked to
biological robustness, for example to the distribution of biological forms (see
[59, 61]). We can predict, for example, that random mutations should on
average produce (algorithmically) simpler phenotypes, potentially leading to
a bias toward simpler phenotypes in nature [30].
The distribution Pr(s) has an interesting particularity: it is the process
that determines its shape and not the initial condition the programs start
out from. This is important because one does not make any assumptions
about the distribution of initial conditions, while one does make assumptions
about the distribution of programs. Programs running on a universal Turing
machine should be uniform, which does not necessarily mean truly random.
For example, to approach Pr(s) from below, one can actually define a set of
programs of a certain size, and define any enumeration to systematically run
the programs one by one and produce the same kind of distribution. This is
an indication of robustness that I take to be a salient property of emergence,
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just as it is a property of many natural systems.
Just as strings can be produced by programs, we may ask after the prob-
ability of a certain outcome from a certain natural phenomenon, if the phe-
nomenon, just like a computing machine, is a process rather than a random
event. If no other information about the phenomenon is assumed, one can
see whether Pr(s) says anything about a distribution of possible outcomes
in the real world. In a world of computable processes, Pr(s) would give the
probability that a natural phenomenon produces a particular outcome and
indicate how often a certain pattern would occur. If you were going to bet
on certain events in the real world, without having any other information,
Pr(s) would be your best option if the generating process were algorithmic
in nature and no other information were available.
3.4 Algorithmic complexity and one-dimensional pat-
terns
It is difficult to measure the algorithmic (Kolmogorov) complexity of a Turing
pattern if given by an ODE. However, because we know that these patterns
can be simulated by CAs, one can measure their algorithmic complexity
by the shortest CA program producing that pattern running on a universal
Turing machine. CAs turn out to have low algorithmic complexity because
programs capable of such complexity can be described in a few bits. More
formally, we can say that the pattern is not random because it can be com-
pressed by the CA program generating it. While the pattern can grow indef-
initely, the CA program length is fixed. On the other hand, use of the coding
theorem also suggests that the algorithmic complexity of a Turing pattern is
low, because there is the empirical finding that many programs are capable
of producing similar, if not the same low complexity patterns. For example,
among the 256 ECA, about two thirds produce trivial behaviour resulting
in the same kind of low complexity patterns. The bias towards simplicity is
clear. This means that it is also true that the most frequent patterns are
those which seem to have the lowest algorithmic complexity, in accordance
with the distribution predicted by the coding theorem. For further informa-
tion these results have been numerically quantified using a compressibility
index in [60] approaching the algorithmic (Kolmogorov) complexity of ECAs.
It is possible to investigate one-dimensional patterns produced by Turing
machines. We have run all (more than 11 × 109) Turing machines with 2
symbols and up to 4 states [18] thanks to the fact that we know the halt-
ing time of the so-called busy beaver Turing machines. After counting the
number of occurrences of strings of length 9 produced by all these TMs
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(see the top 10 occurrences in Table 1) we find that, as the coding theorem
establishes, the most frequent strings have lower random (Kolmogorov) com-
plexity, what one would easily recognise as a “one-dimensional” Turing sort
of pattern. The ones at the top are patterns that we do not find at all inter-
esting, and are among those having the lowest Kolmogorov complexity. But
among skin types in nature, for example, monochromatic skins, such as in
many species of ducks or swans, elephants, dolphins and Hominidae (includ-
ing humans) are common, even if we pay more attention to skin patterns such
as stripes and spots. Among the top 10 of the 29 possible strings, one can
see strings that correspond to recognisable patterns, evidently constrained
by their one-dimensional nature, but along the lines of what one would ex-
pect from “one-dimensional” patterns as opposed to what one would see in
“two-dimensional” (e.g. skin). A one-dimensional spotted or striped string
is one of the form “01” repeated n types.
Table 1: The 10 most frequent one-dimensional patterns produced by all
4-state 2-symbol Turing machines starting from empty input (for full results
see [18]), hence an approximation of Pr(s), the algorithmic probability that
we have denoted by Pr4(s), that is the outcome frequency/multiplicity of the
pattern. The visual representation shows how the pattern would look like if
used as a skin (Turing-type) motif.
output visual frequency
string (s) representation Pr4(s)
000000000 1.3466× 10−7
111111111 1.3466× 10−7
000010000 7.83899× 10−8
111101111 7.83899× 10−8
000000001 7.53699× 10−8
011111111 7.53699× 10−8
100000000 7.53699× 10−8
111111110 7.53699× 10−8
010101010 4.422× 10−8
101010101 4.422× 10−8
To produce Turing-type patterns with Turing machines in order to study
their algorithmic complexity would require two-dimensional Turing machines,
which makes the calculation very difficult in practice due to the combinatorial
explosion of the number of cases to consider. This difficulty can be partially
overcome by sampling, and this is a research project we would like to see
21
developed in the future, but for the time being it is clear that the one-
dimensional case already produces the kinds of patterns one would expect
from a low level general theory of pattern emergence, encompassing Turing-
type patterns and rooted in Turing’s computational universality.
4 Concluding remarks
It seems that one point is now very well established, viz. that universality
can be based on extremely simple mechanisms. The success of applying
ideas from computing theories to biology should encourage researchers to go
further. Dismissing this phenomenon of ubiquitous universality in biology as
a mere technicality having little meaning is a mistake.
In this paper, we have shown that what algorithmic probability conveys
is that structures like Turing patterns will likely be produced as the result of
random computer programs, because structured patterns have low algorith-
mic complexity (are more easily described). A simulation of two-dimensional
Turing machines would produce the kind of patterns that Turing described,
but because running all Turing machines to show how likely this would be
among the distribution of possible patterns is computationally very expen-
sive, one can observe how patterns emerge by running one-dimensional Turing
machines.
As shown in [18], in effect the most common patterns are the ones that
look less random and more structured. In [59] it is also shown that different
computational models produce reasonable and similar frequency distributions
of patterns, with the most frequent outputs being the ones with greater ap-
parent structure, i.e. with lower algorithmic (Kolmogorov) complexity [32].
It is important to point out, however, that we are not suggesting that this low
level process of structure generation substitutes for any mechanism of nat-
ural selection. We are suggesting that computation produces such patterns
and natural selection picks those that are likely to provide an evolutionary
advantage. If the proportion of patterns (e.g. skin patterns among living sys-
tems) are distributed as described by Pr(s), it may be possible to support
this basic model with statistical evidence.
We think this is a reasonable and promising approach for arriving at
an interesting low level formalisation of emergent phenomena, using a purely
computational framework. It is all the more interesting in that it is capable of
integrating two of Alan Turing’s most important contributions to science: his
concept of universal computation and his mechanism of pattern formation,
grounding the latter in the former through the use of algorithmic probability.
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